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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
a licensed attorney or any firm not wholly composed of licensed attorneys
. . ." R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 11694. See also sees. 11692 and 11693. For a case
under the statute see Carey v. Gossom (1920) 204 Mo. App. 695, 218 S. W. 917.
Contracts to solicit business are apparently unaffected by the statute where
both parties are lawyers.
Assuming that the "chaser" contract is declared void for champerty the in-
teresting question arises as to whether the lawyer can recover under a
quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his services. The precise ques-
tion has not been much litigated; but where it has the courts have answered
in the negative. Gammons v. Johnson (1899) 76 Minn. 76, 78 N. W. 1035;
Gammons v. Gulbrauson (1899) 78 Minn. 21, 80 N. W. 779; Ellis a'. Frawley,
supra. C. B. P. '35.
BANKS AND BANKING-POWER OF BANK TO GiVn SECURITY FOR DEPoSITS.-
To secure the waiver of a requirement that the repayment of a deposit by
the receiver of a railroad company with the defendant national bank should
be secured by a surety bond, the bank agreed to post as collateral security for
the deposit Liberty Bonds with a face value equal to the amount of the de-
posit. The motive for this arrangement was a desire to save the expense of
premiums charged by the surety company for the bond. Subsequently the
bank failed. The receiver of the railroad company attempted to force the
liquidator of the bank to turn over the Liberty Bonds. Held: The national
bank had no power under the national banking laws to pledge its assets as
collateral security for private deposits. Since the contract was ultra vires
the bank, the liquidator of the bank could hold the bonds free of any claim by
the receiver of the railroad. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Pottorff (C. C. A. 5,
1933) 63 F. (2d) 1.
There are relatively few cases which have passed upon the power of
national banks to pledge their assets to secure private deposits. Two early
cases dealing with state banks assert that this power exists even though not
expressly conferred by statute since the power given to receive deposits im-
plies the power to make the agreements considered necessary to secure these
deposits. Ward v. Johnson (1880) 95 Ill. 215; Ah v. Rhoads (1877) 84
Pa. 319. With reference to national banks the power was denied in Smith
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1932) 56 F. (2d) 799. The discus-
sion in this latter case is very interesting as showing the respect paid by the
courts to the decisions of administrative officers even as to questions of law.
The majority of the court pointed out that the Comptroller of the Currency
had repeatedly advised the national banks that they had no such power. The
decision glosses over the fact that the same official had ruled that there was
such power as to public deposits. Judge Dickinson dissented in the Smith
case on the ground that it was a common practice to give such collateral se-
curity and that there was no distinction between deposits of political subdi-
visions of states and private deposits when national banks were concerned.
The first reason for this dissent is especially interesting in view of the fact
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that in the principal case the court takes judicial notice that it is not cus-
tomary to give security for deposits.
The cases with reference to public deposits would seem to offer helpful
analogies, although they were rejected by the court in the principal case.
There are some cases which deny any power to state banks to give such col-
lateral security. Arkansas-Louisiana Highway District v. Taylor (1928)
177 Ark. 440, 6 S. W. (2d) 533; Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens'
Trust & Guaranty Co. (1913) 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 160; Farmers' &
Merchants' State Bank v. School District (1928) 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. W.
163; Divide County v. Baird (1926) 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236; Foster v.
Longview (Tex. Comm. of App. 1930) 26 S. W. (2d) 1059. The weight of
authority as to state banks is that they may give such security. Williams v.
Hall (1926) 30 Ariz. 851, 249 Pac. 755; First American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Palm Beach (1928) 46 Fla. 247, 117 So. 900; Andrew v. Odebolt Savings
Bank (1927) 203 Iowa 1335, 214 N. W. 559; French v. School District (Mo.
App. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 415; Richmond Casualty Co. v. Page Trust Go.
(1928) 195 N. C. 545, 142 S. E. 786; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Board of
County Commissioners (1927) 128 Okla. 58, 260 Pac. 1112; Cameron v.
Christy (1926) 286 Pa. 405, 133 Atl. 551. Similar power has been recog-
nized to exist in national banks. Burrowes v. Nimcocks (C. C. A. 4, 1929)
35 F. (2d) 152; Sneeden v. City of Marion (D. C. E. D. Ill. 1932) 58 F.
(2d) 341; Pottorff v. El Paso-Hudspeth Road District (C. C. A. 5, 1933) 62 F.
(2d) 498. This result is made certain for the future by the passage of a
statute expressly granting this power, 46 Stat. 809 (1930), 12 U. S. C. 90.
Although the federal cases carefully distinguish between public and private
deposits, this is not true of the state cases with rare exceptions, e. g., First
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Palm Beach, above. There would seem to be
no real reason for making any distinction unless it be possible to imply the
grant of the power as to public deposits alone from the fact that the state
statutes prescribe that the designated banks shall give security for these
deposits.
All these cases draw a sharp distinction between loans to a bank and de-
posits in it, admitting that secured loans are proper. This difference is
largely based upon custom and legislative usage in prescribing banking
regulations. However, there are certain practical reasons of considerable
importance for this distinction. A deposit is subject to check, while even a
demand loan cannot be so treated. Moreover, bank statements keep the two
items separated. The general financial public considers that the presence
of loans among the liabilities of the bank is evidence that the bank is or has
been in bad condition and is or has been in need of funds to pay the demands
of its depositors. An expansion of the loan item is a danger signal, while
an expansion of deposits ordinarily shows that the bank is prospering.
Thus, there would seem to be a ground for the different treatment of de-
posits and loans; but it would seem that in the absence of statute there is
no reason for the special treatment of public deposits. G. W. S., '33.
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